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I. INTRODUCTION

When Jane Smith1 was admitted to a local hospital with a treatable
illness, she expected the medical staff to treat her according to the
appropriate standard of care. Her husband and daughter expected the same.
Unfortunately, her treating physician ordered the administration of
intravenous (V) fluids that were incompatible with other medication she
was receiving. Jane died just a few minutes after the fluids were injected
into her body. Because Jane worked as a volunteer at her daughter's
school, her family incurred little economic loss as a result of her death.
Under the new Illinois cap on damages, Jane's family would have been able
to recover only $500,000 in noneconomic damages for the doctor's
negligence.
Like economic damages, noneconomic damages are compensatory they are meant to reimburse Jane's family for losses they incurred as a
*
Patrick A. Salvi is a managing partner with the law firm of Salvi, Schostok &
Pritchard P.C. with offices in Waukegan and Chicago, Illinois. Patrick A. Salvi is one of the
most prominent personal injury and medical malpractice attorneys in the country and was
recently named as one of the "Best Lawyers in America" by Woodward/White, Inc. Over
the past several years, Patrick A. Salvi and Salvi, Schostok & Pritchard have won verdicts
and settlements totaling over $330 million.
1. I have decided to use a fictitious name in order to respect the confidentiality of
the client, the client's family, and their settlement agreement. The medical facts, however,
are those of a real case.
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result of the doctor's fault. Damage caps stifle the compensatory nature of
noneconomic damages. No matter how grave the injury, how severe the
loss, the reimbursement in Illinois is now limited to $500,000. The result is
that, if Jane's death had occurred today, her family would be inadequately
and unfairly compensated for the losses they suffered as a result of the
doctor's negligence. This system places the burden of "tort reform" on the
most severely injured plaintiffs.
Although trial lawyers may realize the inequities of damage caps, a
recent poll conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation found that most
Americans do not.2 Approximately 63% of the people polled favored caps
on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases. This preference is
based on the belief that capping noneconomic damages will somehow lead
to a decrease in medical costs. Nearly 70% of the people questioned said
they believed that limiting pain-and-suffering would
help "a lot" (32%) or
"some" (37%) in reducing overall health costs. 4
However, these opinions indicate the public's misunderstanding of the
negligible effect damage caps have on malpractice premiums, access to
health care, and health care costs, compared with the catastrophic effect
caps impose on victims of medical malpractice.
1I. FACTS ABOUT CAPS
Damage caps do not reduce medical malpractice insurance premiums.
The ineffectiveness of damage caps was recently presented in a congressional hearing. 5 Testimony demonstrated that of the five states with the
highest medical malpractice insurance premiums, Florida, Michigan,
Nevada, Ohio, and West Virginia, all have damage caps. 6 In contrast, the
state with the lowest medical malpractice insurance premiums, Oklahoma,
does not have a damage cap. 7 A recent study shows that medical malpractice payouts in Oklahoma have actually decreased 16.4%, after adjusting for

2.
Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard School of Public Health Survey, Health
CareAgenda for the New Congress (January 2005), availableat
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/uploadtHealth-Care-Agenda-for-the-New-Congress-SurveyToplines.pdf.
3.
Id. at 19.
4.
Id. at 20.
5.
Assessing the Need to Enact Medical Liability Reform: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives,
108th Cong. 13 (2003), availableat http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/action/108-2.pdf.
6.
Id.at 14.
7.
Id.

20061
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inflation.8 Nonetheless, there has been a recent push to pass legislation in
Oklahoma which would limit noneconomic damages to $300,000. 9
Not only are damage caps ineffective in reducing premiums, they are
also unable to avoid significant premium increases. For example, soon
after Texas passed a state constitutional amendment authorizing damage
caps, some insurers requested rate hikes as high as 35% for doctors and
60% for hospitals.' 0 Similarly, in Florida insurers requested premium
increases of up to 45% immediately after damage cap legislation was
passed." In fact, a recent study by Weiss Ratings, Inc, an independent
insurance rating agency, concluded that damage caps were likely to
increase rather than decrease medical malpractice insurance rates.' 2 The
study examined median premium costs from 1991 to 2002. During the
period of the study, premiums rose 48.2% in states that had damage caps,
but only 35.9% in states without caps. 13 This statistic is particularly
compelling in light of the fact that the median claim payout was higher in
states without damage caps.' 4 The results of this study led Weiss Ratings,
Inc. to conclude that there
are "other, far more significant factors driving
5
premium rates higher.'
In addition to this statistical evidence, the insurance industry itself has
demonstrated that damage caps are ineffective in reducing medical
malpractice premiums. In response to an unfavorable report on "tort
reform," the American Insurance Association admitted that insurers "never
promised that tort reform will achieve specific savings," and that there are
"other state-specific factors that affect premium levels, such as taxes, fees,
and the degree of market competition."' 6 The Medical Assurance Company
8.
Congress Watch Public Citizen, Medical Misdiagnosis in Oklahoma:
Challenging the Medical Malpractice Claims of the Doctors' Lobby, 9 (2004), availableat
http://www.citizen.org/documents/OklahomaReportFinal_4.21.pdf.
9.
Id. at 1.
10.
Darrin Schlegel, Some Malpractice Rates to Rise Despite Prop. 12, Hous.
CHRON., Nov. 19, 2003 at Al, available at
www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=2003_3709161.
11.
Julie Kay, Medical Malpractice: Surprise Hikes Despite Legislation that
Promisedto Reign in Physicians' Premiums, Three Firms Filefor Big Rate Increases, PALM
BEACH DAILY Bus. REv., Nov 20, 2003.
12.
Martide D. Weiss, Melissa Gannon, and Stephanie Eakins, Medical Malpractice
Caps The Impact of Non-Economic Damage Caps on PhysicianPremiums, Claims Payout
Levels, and Availability of Coverage (2003), availableat
http://www.weissratings.comlmalpractice.asp (last visited March 27, 2006).
13.
Id. at 3.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
American Insurance Association, AIA Cites Fatal Flaws in Critic's Report on
Tort Reform, (March 13, 2002), available at
http://www.aiadc.org/DocFrame.asp?DoclD=7027.
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of Mississippi, a "crisis" state that actually has a cap, stated that tort reform
does "not provide a magical 'silver-bullet' that will immediately affect
medical malpractice insurance rates."' 17 Additionally, St. Paul Insurance
Company stated that Florida's non-economic cap "will produce little or no
savings to the tort system as it pertains to medical malpractice."' 8 Donald
Zuk, Chief Executive of SCPIE Holdings, a leading malpractice insurer in
California, said, "I don't like to hear insurance-company executives say it's
the tort system-it's self-inflicted."'19
But perhaps the strongest indictment against tort "reform" came from
the nation's largest medical malpractice insurer, G.E. Medical Protective.
In 2004, G.E. admitted that damage caps will not lower physicians'
premiums. 20 G.E. has pushed for higher physician premiums in states that
already have caps, seeking a 29.2% rate hike in California and a 19% rate
hike in Texas.2 1 As Douglas Heller, the executive director of the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights in Santa Monica, California stated,
"[w]hen the largest malpractice insurer in the nation tells a regulator that
caps on damages don't work, every legislator, regulator and voter in the
nation should listen. 2 2
II. FACTS ABOUT ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE
One common argument advanced by damage cap proponents is that, as
a result of prohibitively high malpractice premiums, doctors will cease
practicing medicine in states without caps, and as a result patients in those
states will experience reduced access to health care. For example, in
Florida, hospital associations reported that access to newborn delivery
services had been reduced due to the closure of five hospital obstetrics
units.2 3 However, as the United States General Accounting Office (GAO)
reported, each hospital had been experiencing low demand, which
ultimately led to the closings. In addition, the closings were in separate
17.
Julie Goodman, Premiums Rise by 45%, CLARION-LEDGER, Sep. 22, 2002, at 2.
18.
The Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, Nation's LargestMedical
Malpractice Insurer Declares Caps on Damages Don't Work, Raises Docs' Premiums:
Smoking Gun Document Exposes Insurance Industry Lies, Oct. 26, 2004, available at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.net/insurance/pr/pr0048698.php3.
19.
Rachel Zimmerman & Christopher Oster, Insurers' Missteps Helped Provoke
Malpractice "Crisis," WALL ST. J., Jun. 24, 2002, availableat
http://pqsab.pqarchiver.conwsj/access/1 2803182.html?.
20.
The Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, supra note 18.
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice: Implications of Rising
Premiums on Access to Health Care (2003), availableat
www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf.
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locations in the state, and in each case nearby obstetrics units were
available in each situation.24
Similarly, one report claimed that twenty-four ob/gyns had left Pennsylvania because of concerns regarding malpractice premiums.2 5 However,
during the time period in question, the population of women between the
ages of 18 and 40 decreased by 18,000, suggesting that a decrease in
demand for ob/gyn services, rather than concerns about malpractice, may
have been behind the decision of those doctors to leave the state.26
IV. FACTS ABOUT HEALTH CARE COSTS

Another popular argument put forth by cap proponents is that, without
damage caps, high malpractice judgments will drive health care costs,
which are already high, to prohibitive levels. However, according to the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), malpractice costs account for less
than 2% of all health care spending in the United States. 27 Even assuming,
as the CBO does, that damage caps will reduce malpractice costs by 25% to
30%, and that 100% of the saving are passed on to consumers, the savings
will only be a miniscule 0.4 to 0.5% for the entire population.28 In reality,
consumers are likely to experience an even lower percentage in savings
after the insurance and health care industries take their cuts from any
savings. In addition, the CBO found "no statistical difference in per capita
health care spending between states with and without limits on malpractice
torts.' ' 29 This fact indicates that damage caps do not decrease health care
costs.
Similarly, cap proponents argue that fear of malpractice litigation
leads physicians to practice "defense medicine," ordering more diagnostic
tests and issuing more specialist referrals than they believe are necessary.
These extra tests and specialist visits, proponents argue, will unnecessarily
increase overall health care costs for the patients. Not only are such
"defensive medicine" practices uncommon, but where they do exist they
may have nothing to do with the presence or lack of damage caps. For
example, the CBO stated that "some so-called defensive medicine may be
motivated less by liability concerns than by the income it generates for
physicians or by the positive (albeit small) benefits to patients ....
CBO
believes that savings from reducing defensive medicine would be very
24.
Id.
25.
Id. at 17, tbl. 1.
26.
Id. at 18.
27.
Cong. Budget Office, Limiting Tort Liability for Medical Malpractice (2004),
availableat www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4968&sequence=0.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
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small.,, 30 Thus, according to the CBO, defensive medicine practices cannot
be attributed to fears of medical malpractice claims, nor do these practices
significantly increase health care costs.
V. FACTS ABOUT MALPRACTICE LITIGATION

Some cap proponents claim that, in addition to increasing medical
malpractice premiums, physicians are forced to leave the practice of
medicine because of a fear of frivolous litigation. Despite alarming
assertions by proponents of "tort reform," victims of medical malpractice
are not overly litigious. In fact, relatively few medical malpractice cases
are filed. In the Harvard Medical Malpractice Study I, investigators
determined that less than 2% of malpractice victims file a lawsuit against
their doctors. 3 1 The results of a recent Wall Street Journal study reported
that both payouts in medical malpractice suits and the number of filings per
capita have remained steady in recent years.32 In addition, claims paid by
ISMIE, Illinois' largest medical malpractice insurer, decreased each year
from 1999 to 2003. 3
In addition to relatively few medical malpractice cases being filed,
those that are filed are difficult to win. St. Clair County, in southern
Illinois, has been labeled a "judicial hellhole" by the American Tort Reform
Foundation (ATR Foundation), based on allegations of excessive litigation
and verdicts. 34 However, of the 295 medical malpractice claims filed
between 1999 and 2004 in St. Clair county, only ten cases proceeded to a
verdict at trial." Of those ten cases, only two resulted in verdicts for the
plaintiffs.36 According to this statistical history, Illinois' new damage cap
will affect less than 1% of medical malpractice cases filed in St. Clair
County.
On a national level, the U.S. Department of Justice found that only
approximately 27% of medical malpractice claims that proceed to trial

id.
30.
Kelly K. Meadows, Note: Resolving Medical Malpractice Disputes in
31.
Massachusetts: Statutory and Judicial Initiatives in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 4
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL& APP. ADVoc. 165, 169 (1999).
32.

MalpracticeAwards Stay Flat, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2004.

33.
Coalition for Consumer Rights, Opening ISMIE's Books: An Inside Look at
Illinois' Largest Medical MalpracticeInsurer(June 2004).
American Tort Reform Foundation, Judicial Hellholes 2004, available at
34.
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2004.
35.
Laninya A. Cason, Senate Bill 475 - Cause for Concern or Self-Generated
Crisis?, THE CATALYST (I11.Bar Ass'n), Jan. 2006, at 3.
36.
Id.
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prevail, about half the rate of success of other tort claims.37 In addition,
relatively few medical malpractice cases proceed to trial. According to the
Insurance Information Institute, only 1.3% of medical malpractice cases
filed result in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff at trial.38 Damage caps
affect even fewer cases, since many of the 1.3% that prevail in trial will
have verdicts below the capped amount. In light of the small percentage of
medical malpractice cases on which damage caps act, it is easy to see why
damage caps are ineffective in lowering medical malpractice premiums.
Yet these caps have a catastrophic effect on the individual plaintiffs who
receive inadequate and unfair compensation for life-changing losses.
VI.
A.

SOLUTIONS

INSURANCE REFORM

Proponents of damage caps often point to California as an example of
the effectiveness of caps in reducing medical malpractice premiums. In the
mid 1970's, California passed the Injury Compensation Reform Act (or
"MICRA"), "tort reform" which included a $250,000 cap on noneconomic

damages. 39 Despite this cap, malpractice premiums increased 450% over
the thirteen years following the "tort reform." 4 It wasn't until California
passed insurance reform through Proposition 103 that malpractice
premiums stabilized. 41 This insurance reform froze insurance premium
rates, required insurers to obtain approval from the government for rate
42
increases greater than 15%, and repealed insurance antitrust exemptions.
Following the insurance reform, premium rates dropped 31% in just
three years, after adjusting for inflation, and since then rates have risen only
in proportion to inflation.4 3 Thus, California's insurance reform, not "tort
reform," is responsible for the decrease in malpractice premiums.
37.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Medical Malpractice Trials and Verdicts in Large
Counties (2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/mmtvlc01.htm.
38.
Insurance Information Institute, Medical Malpractice, available at
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/medicalmal/ (last visited April 25, 2006).
39.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (Deering 2004).
40.
Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, False Accounting: How
Medical Malpractice InsuranceCompanies Inflate Losses to Justify Sudden Surges in Rates
and Tort Reform (Dec. 2005), availableat
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/malpractice/rp/1008.pdf.
41.
The Medical Liability Insurance Crisis: A Review of the Situation in
Pennsylvania: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 130 (2003) (statement of Harvey Rosenfield,
President, Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/action/108-4.pdf.
42.
Id. at 133-34.
43.
Id. at 136, 139.
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Insurers make most of their profits not from premiums, but from investments made using the capital generated by premiums. 44 Thus, insurers
can afford to offer lower rates when the market is strong and their
investments are turning profits. However, when interest rates are low or the
stock market is sluggish (as has generally been the case the last few years),
insurers must make up for this lost income through higher premiums.4 5 In
fact, recent studies have shown that the timing and severity of malpractice
"crises" are strongly correlated with fluctuations in the market, rather than
with changes in litigation patterns or verdict amounts.46 Further evidence
indicates that past "crises" have only receded when the market has
recovered.47
Market competition also affects the insurance industry just as it does
any other business. The experience of St. Paul Company, once one of the
largest medical malpractice insurance companies in the United States,
illustrates this point. After St. Paul released about $1.1 billion in reserves
(which looked like profit), many new insurance carriers entered the market.
Intense competition led to premium rates so low that premiums could no
longer cover malpractice claims. As a result, St. Paul pulled out of the
malpractice insurance market, causing a huge supply and demand problem
for physicians in some states.48 These facts demonstrate that, contrary to
cap proponents' arguments, insurance premiums are dictated by market
fluctuations and supply and demand in the insurance industry, not
malpractice litigation. Therefore, in order to reduce malpractice premiums,
lawmakers should advocate changes to the insurance industry.
B.

MERIT RATING

One primary cause of increasing medical malpractice premiums is an
increase in medical malpractice. In the United States, more people are
killed each year as a result of medical malpractice than die in car accidents

44.
Americans for Insurance Reform, Medical Malpractice Insurance: Stable
Losses/Unstable Rates in Illinois (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.insurancereform.org/StableLosseslL.pdf.
45.
Center for Justice and Democracy, A Short Guide to Understanding Today's
Medical Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" (and Useful Questions to Ask) (Sept. 25, 2002),
available at http://www.centerjd.org/MediaGuide.pdf.
46.
Mitchell J. Nathanson, It's the Economy (and Combined Ratio), Stupid:
Examining the Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Critical to
Reform, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 1077, 1081-82 (2004).
See Americans for Insurance Reform, Medical Malpractice Insurance: Stable
47.
Losses/Unstable Rates 2004 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.insurancereform.org/StableLosses04.pdf.
Center for Justice and Democracy, supra note 45.
48.
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and workplace accidents combined. 49 A study published by The Wall
Street Journal in 2004 estimated that medical errors contributed to almost
600,000 patient deaths over just three years. 50 Even more people are
otherwise injured as a result of medical negligence. In many instances, a
very small percentage of doctors are responsible for a disproportionately
high percentage of the malpractice payouts. For example, about 54% of
medical malpractice settlements and judgments can be attributed to about
5% of all doctors.51 Oftentimes, these doctors are the ones that have
numerous sizeable payouts. And yet, a doctor's history of medical
malpractice payouts does not affect his or her malpractice premiums.
When a driver negligently causes an auto accident, his or her insurance
premiums are increased to reflect the increased risk the insurance company
incurs. This system is referred to as "merit" or "experience" rating. This
system is premised on the fact that not all insured have the same risk of
incurring future negligence claims. Experience rating is a way of allocating
the risk of future negligence claims according to each insured's individual
risk of incurring a claim in the future. Consider two drivers, similar in all
respects except that Driver A has had numerous car accidents and Driver B
has not had any. Statistically, Driver A poses a higher risk of incurring a
future claim than does Driver B. Consequently, in a merit rating system,
Driver A's insurance premiums would be higher than Driver B's, to reflect
Driver A's increased risk of future claims.
Unfortunately, medical malpractice insurance is not merit rated. This
means that a doctor who has numerous malpractice payouts pays the same
insurance premiums as other doctors in the same specialty and geographical
area. Essentially, all the doctors in the same specialty, regardless of claim
history, share the risk of future lawsuits. This system is particularly
troubling in light of statistics indicating that a small proportion of doctors
contribute to the majority of medical malpractice payouts. For example,
one study found that 6% of anesthesiologists and obstetrician-gynecologists
were responsible for 87% of malpractice payouts in those specialties.52
Under the current system, the anesthesiologists and obstetriciangynecologists who have not had any malpractice payouts are assessed the
same premiums as those who have had numerous payouts. This system
49.
TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH, 1-13 (2005) available at
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/036480.html.
50.
Paul Davies, Fatal Medical Errors Said to be More Widespread, WALL ST. J.,
July 27, 2004, availableat
http://online.wsj.com/article-print/0,,SB 109088045221774311,00.html.
51.
Dissenting Views to H.R. 5, The House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2,
availableat http://www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/hr5dissentingl08cong.pdf.
52.
Frank A. Sloan, Experience Rating: Does it Make Sense for Medical
MalpracticeInsurance?, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 128, 129 (1990).
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forces lower-risk physicians to pay higher premiums in order to cover the
costs incurred by higher-risk physicians in the same specialty. When such a
small percentage of doctors are responsible for numerous payouts and
errors, there is cause for concern regarding those few doctors. Failing to
assess premiums based on claim history is unfair to the lower-risk
physicians, who represent the majority of practicing physicians, and must
consequently pay higher premiums than their individual risk requires. Even
worse, this system is unfair to patients who are treated by high-risk
physicians with a pattern of malpractice payouts, but who are sheltered by
the ability to spread the risk they incur across the less negligent-prone
doctors in their specialty.
Skeptics often claim that merit rating is unfair to doctors who experience numerous claims because of "bad luck" rather than negligence.
However, experience rating uses sophisticated statistical analyses to assess
the likelihood of a future claim based on past claims.53 The statistics
account for the increased risk of claims based on high risk specialties,
procedures, and services, and assess the probability that past claims
increase the likelihood of future claims. 54 It is important to point out that
the more payouts an individual doctor has in comparison to the average
number of payouts for his or her specialty, the more likely it is that the
doctor will incur future payouts. Studies have clearly shown that, despite
claims of "bad luck," a history with significantly more payouts than the
average for the specialty is an important predictor of future claims."
VII. CONCLUSION
Capping damages does not lower malpractice premiums, decrease
health care costs, or increase access to health care. In order to effect these
changes, lawmakers should focus on regulating the insurance industry and
reforming malpractice insurance policies. In addition, reforms should focus
on reducing the incidence of malpractice, and allocating the risk of future
malpractice payouts equitably such that individual physicians are assessed
premiums based on their individual risk of future malpractice payouts. Not
only do arbitrary damage caps deprive patients who experience severe, lifechanging losses and injuries of fair compensation, but they do so without
affecting any of the benefits their proponents promise. Such caps do not
resolve the medical malpractice "crisis" - they only punish innocent
victims.
53.
For a detailed discussion of the statistical methods, see Carrie Lynn Vine,
Comment, Addressing the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Alternatives to Damage
Caps, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 413 (2006).
54.
See Sloan, supra note 52.
55.
Id.

